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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the impact of institutional difference on China’s outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) through a gravity model. Our estimations are based on a large panel of 150 
countries over the period 2003-2015. The results show that the institutional differences of 
government effectiveness and control of corruption between China and a host country have a 
statistically significant negative effect on China’s OFDI. In addition, our empirical evidence 
suggests that the ‘One Belt One Road’ policy does not have the expected positive effect on 
China’s OFDI. Consistent results are obtained from a set of robustness tests. Our findings 
provide a reasonable guideline for countries aiming to attract Chinese OFDI or seeking factors 
to boost it. 
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1. Introduction    
Although much empirical work has focused on understanding the determinants of China’s 
outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI), the influence on OFDI of the institutional 
contexts both at home (China) and in host countries, has received considerably less attention. 
China's OFDI has increased dramatically over the past two decades. The Chinese non-
financial OFDI increased from $5.5 billion in 2004 to $181.2 billion in 2016, rising by 
approximately 33 times (Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 
2015). Such an impressive growth of OFDI from China might be due to the government 
policy support and the rapid growth of Chinese companies. For example, the Chinese 
government has been enthusiastically encouraging its “One Belt One Road” strategy1 since 
2013, to export China's enormous manufacturing output and encourage Chinese companies to 
expand their business overseas.  
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the determinants of China’s OFDI 
with a focus on the impact of institutional distance on OFDI, using a comprehensive dataset 
estimated through a gravity model. The standard gravity model is based on the notion that the 
magnitude of bilateral trade flows can be explained by the economic mass of host and home 
countries and the geographic distance between them (Abbott and De Vita, 2011; Deardorff, 
2011). The model has been further extended to accommodate the concept of ‘distance’ in 
terms of productivity, institution, and culture, among others. Thus, according to the extended 
                                                          
1 "One Belt One Road" lunched by president Xi Jinping in 2013, is an export oriented strategy aimed 
at connecting China with its neighbours in Asia, Europe and Africa. The goal of this strategy, as 
stated by the National Development and Reform Commission (2015), is about “promoting orderly 
and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of 
markets; encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to achieve economic policy coordination 
and carry out broader and more in-depth regional cooperation of higher standards; and jointly 
creating an open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits 
all.” 
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gravity model, we would expect that greater institutional distance is an important determinant 
of FDI activity. 
At the theoretical level, several propositions exist in the literature with regard to the 
importance of institutional distance on FDI. Seyoum (2009) suggests that multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are under dual pressures from both home and host institutional 
environments and the selection of entering a similar market can reduce the uncertainty 
inherent in foreign market entry. In addition, MNEs have to change their business strategies 
to meet the requirements of local institutions when entering foreign markets. Based on the 
‘familiarity bias’ perspective, in general, MNEs prefer to invest in host countries with a 
similar institutional or cultural environment. MNEs from countries with strong institutional 
quality are less likely to invest in countries with weaker institutional quality and vice versa. 
The institutional distance between host and home countries leads MNEs to pay extra costs on 
adjusting their strategies to adapt to the institutional environment in host countries. Such 
adaptation costs lower MNEs’ profitability thus reducing their investment motivation (Cezar 
and Escobar, 2015). As a consequence, the higher the institutional distance between host and 
home country, the lower the amount of OFDI to be expected.  
Many studies have explored the determinants of Chinese OFDI (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Cheung and Qian, 2009; Zhang and Daly, 2011; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 
2012; Wang et al., 2012; Buckley et al., 2016; Che et al., 2017), finding that labour costs, 
market size, natural resources as well as institutional factors significantly affect China’s 
OFDI. Yet, empirical knowledge as to how home-host country institutional differences drive 
OFDI from China remains unclear. Similarly, although the literature emphasises that host 
country institutional factors (Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012) or home country 
institutional characteristics (Wang et al., 2012) matter for Chinese OFDI, the impact of 
institutional distance between host country and China on Chinese OFDI is largely untested. 
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The two notable exceptions are Buckley et al. (2016) and Che et al. (2017). Buckley et al. 
(2016) include institutional factors for both China and host countries and investigate the 
impact of institutional factors on cross-border merger and acquisitions in China. Che et al. 
(2017) investigate the institutional distance nexus of Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) as a 
proxy of inward FDI in China. However, neither of these studies attempted to examine the 
impact of institutional distance on the volume of OFDI from China, and at a macro-level. 
The present study contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we emphasise the 
importance of institutional differences rather than the level of institutional quality per se, as 
we find a positive and significant impact of institutional differences and an insignificant 
effect of institutional quality. Second, we examine the relationship between institutional 
differences and OFDI using different dimensions of institutional indicators instead of using 
an aggregate institutional index as commonly employed in prior studies (e.g. Bekaert et al., 
2011; Slesman et al., 2015). Findings based on the distinct dimensions of institutional 
difference allow us to provide more specific guidelines for countries aiming to attract 
Chinese OFDI or seeking factors to boost it.  
To carry out our investigation, we employ a gravity model to analyse the determinants 
of Chinese OFDI. We find that the institutional differences of government effectiveness and 
control of corruption have a robust and negative effect on China’s OFDI. However, we do not 
find any robust effect of basic variables (e.g. China’s GDP, GDP of host country, geographic 
distance) used in the standard gravity model. In addition, we also examine the effect of the 
‘One Belt One Road’ policy. Specifically, whether it increases the amount of Chinese OFDI. 
In contrast to prior studies (Huang, 2016; Du and Zhang 2018) - which suggest that the ‘One 
Belt One Road’ initiative encourages Chinese OFDI activities - our results suggest that the 
‘One Belt One Road’ policy, so far, appears to be an obstruction to Chinese OFDI. 
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 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review. Section 3 discusses the methodology and data. Section 4 presents the empirical 
analysis. Section 5 reports the robustness tests and highlights some policy implications. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Buckley and Casson (1976) conclude that firms use FDI to replace imperfect external 
markets or internal shortages in products and knowledge (e.g. exporting and licensing), and 
until the costs of further internalisation outweigh the benefits. Dunning's eclectic paradigm 
concludes that there are three primary motivations for FDI (Dunning, 1988): foreign-market-
seeking FDI; efficiency-seeking (cost reduction) FDI; resource-seeking FDI (resource-
seeking or strategic- asset-seeking).  
There have been many empirical studies investigating the determinants of FDI that 
have, when taken collectively, provided mixed results depending on the choice of model 
specification, sample and empirical method employed (e.g. Brada et al., 2006; Brada et al., 
2012; Blonigen and Piger, 2014; Bojnec and Fertő 2017; Bojnec and Fertő 2018; Li et al., 
2017). Using data for seven transition economies of Central Europe over the period 1993-
2001, Brada et al. (2006) find that FDI inflows are not affected by factors such as conflict and 
political instability. Brada et al. (2012) analyse the effect of corruption on FDI inflows in six 
East European transition economies over the period 2000-2003 and suggest that there is a 
negative relationship between the level of corruption in host country and the likelihood of 
MNEs locating in that country. Also, they find a U-shape relationship between the level of 
corruption and the amount of FDI inflows. Blonigen and Piger (2014) primarily focus on the 
OECD countries during the period 1990-2000 and use Bayesian statistical techniques to 
select a set of candidate variables most likely to determine FDI inflows. They point out that 
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factors including traditional gravity variables, cultural distance, relative labour endowments 
and trade agreements are likely to have explanatory power in FDI determination while they 
find little evidence in favour of factors such as multilateral trade openness, most business 
costs, and host country institutions in attracting FDI. Bojnec and Fertő (2017) investigate the 
impact of globalisation and corruption on OFDI for 22 OECD countries and suggest that FDI 
is more likely in corruption-free and economically globalised OECD host countries. 
Similarly, Bojnec and Fertő (2018) find that OFDI is driven positively by globalisation, a 
corruption-free environment, cross-country similarity, and money laundering in the host 
country, but negatively by the existence of tax havens in host countries. Li et al. (2017), using 
economic sectoral data for 128 developing countries over the period 2003-2012, find 
evidence that control of corruption has a positive and significant effect on FDI inflows to the 
primary and secondary sectors of the host country and government stability has a positive and 
significant association with FDI inflows to the tertiary sector, while civil war has a negative 
impact on FDI inflows to the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
 
2.1 Determinants of OFDI in China 
Since FDI theory is mostly developed on the basis of the investment experience of 
industrialised countries, it is widely recognised that it requires a special application to the 
Chinese context (see, e.g. Buckley et al., 2007). Capital market imperfections may promote 
Chinese OFDI to explore capital for lower borrowing rates than domestic conventional 
financing. Moreover, Chinese MNEs have ownership advantages that allow them to operate 
more effectively than local firms and industrialised countries’ MNEs. These ownership 
advantages may be due to China’s business group which is defined as being bound by formal 
or informal ties, benefiting from inward linkages and institutional support via economising 
the use of capital and resources for internationalisation (Yiu, 2011). Additionally, the 
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institutional factors for host and home country could also determine the ability and the 
willingness of domestic firms to invest abroad.  
There are many empirical studies on the determinants of China’s OFDI. Buckley et al. 
(2007) find that Chinese OFDI is associated with high levels of political risk, cultural 
proximity, and market size in host countries from 1984 to 2001; and with host natural 
resources and endowments from 1992 to 2001. Similarly, Cheung and Qian (2009) and 
Zhang and Daly (2011) find that China’s OFDI is positively related to international trade, 
market size, and resource-seeking (endowments of natural resources).  Few, relatively recent 
studies, focus on Chinese investment abroad by considering institutional factors. Seyoum and 
Lin (2015) find that government incentive packages of host countries affect Chinese OFDI in 
Ethiopia. Wang et al. (2012) suggest that the government support was a critical factor in the 
observed trend of OFDI by Chinese firms. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) find that countries with a 
large market, rich in natural resources and poor institutions appear to be attractive to Chinese 
OFDI. Previous literature suggests that the motivations of Chinese OFDI are seeking market 
and natural resources such as coal and iron ore, among others. However, the impact of 
institutional factors is still inconclusive, the possible reason might be that these studies do not 
include a measure of institutional factors, the ‘institutional distance’ between host and home 
countries. 
 
2.2 Institutional differences and FDI 
The early institutional-FDI theory focuses on home country and provides two opposite views 
on the relationship between home country institutional factors and FDI. Buckley et al. (2007) 
indicate that the will and ability of firms to invest abroad are facilitated or constrained by 
institutional factors. For example, supportive policies introduced by home country 
governments will encourage firms to engage in overseas expansion. On the other hand, Luo et 
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al. (2010) suggest that a poor institutional environment in the home country, such as a weak 
legal system, corruption, regulatory uncertainty, and limited intellectual property rights 
protection, may increase firms to move abroad in pursuit of more efficient institutions. 
Nevertheless, though home country institutional factors would have some impact on FDI 
when entering foreign markets, firms should follow the local institutional requirements, FDI 
would also be influenced by host country institutional factors. A recent study by Cezar and 
Escobar (2015) provides a theoretical explanation; MNEs face fixed adaptation costs in 
adjusting to the institutional environments from home country to host country, thus 
suggesting that greater institutional distance would increase adaptation costs, lower firm 
profits, and reduce the number of firms that undertake FDI. They examine empirically the 
impact of institutional distance on outward and inward FDI in 31 OECD countries and the 
results confirm their theoretical postulation. However, they use principal component analysis 
to construct only one index as a proxy of overall institutional distance. Chanegriha et al. 
(2017) investigate the determinants of FDI in 168 countries over the period 1970-2006 using 
extreme bounds analysis and suggest that institutional quality and quality of governance 
matter.2 There is a strand of cross-country studies that shows that institutional distance 
between host and home country in terms of corruption level (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), 
                                                          
2 Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) constitutes a relatively useful way of dealing with the problem of 
selecting variables for an empirical model in a situation where there are conflicting or inconclusive 
suggestions in the literature by establishing which of these variables are robust or fragile 
determinants. However, our interest in this paper does not centre on conducting a sensitivity analysis 
to determine which among the long list of potential economic, geographical and political variables 
suggested in the literature review are robust or fragile determinants of FDI but rather, on the impact of 
institutional difference on China’s OFDI through a gravity model which, by itself, provides a priori 
expectations as to which control variables should be included. As such, we do not concern ourselves 
with robustness tests using EBA. Moreover, as pointed out by Temple (2000), robustness of a variable 
(in the sense that its significance is not depending on the choice of conditioning variables) is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for an interesting finding and, especially if causality is indirect 
(e.g. a variable affects investment or human capital), EBA robustness should be interpreted extremely 
carefully. In addition, a robust variable may not be very interesting as robustness is defined in terms 
of significance of coefficients. A robust variable may therefore be of little quantitative importance. 
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legal rules (Guiso et al., 2009), and bureaucracy and legal constraints (Benassy-Quere et al., 
2007), reduces bilateral FDI flows.  
Regarding the empirical FDI studies in the China context, Buckley et al. (2016) 
investigate location strategies of Chinese cross-border merger and acquisitions (M&As) 
during the period 1985–2011 across 150 economies and find that both institutional factors in 
China and in the host countries are important location determinants, and that the amount of 
investment of Chinese M&As is positively related to poor host country institutional factors. 
Che et al. (2017) focus on the impact of institutional distance between host and home country 
on inward FDI in China and find that Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) from countries with 
better institutions than China are more sensitive to institutional difference. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The basis of our empirical model is the FDI gravity model that is widely used in the 
economics and international business literature to explain country-level trade and FDI flows 
(Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk, 2010). Newton's law of universal gravitation states that the 
gravitational forces between two objects depend on their mass and distance. In the context of 
FDI, larger economies (as measured by GDP) are expected to have greater FDI activity, while 
greater geographic distance leads to less FDI activity. Blonigen and Piger (2014) find that the 
main gravity variables - GDP and geographic distance – are the most robustly significant 
determinants of FDI flows. More specifically, a country with larger economic size is 
expected to have greater demand and production potential for products as an importing and 
an exporting country. These results are fairly consistent across FDI studies that use the 
gravity framework (see, for example, Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk, 2010; Fratianni et al., 2011; 
Abbott et al., 2012) also using alternative estimation methods, such as Cushman and De Vita 
(2017) who employ propensity score matching rather than regression analysis. But we should 
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emphasise that whilst GDP, as a proxy for economic size, has often been found to be a 
significant determinant of FDI, many studies on the causal link between FDI and economic 
growth have also shown that FDI has a significant impact on growth. For example, Hansen 
and Rand (2006), who specifically test for Granger causal relationships between FDI and 
GDP in a sample of 31 developing countries covering 31 years using estimators for 
heterogeneous panel data, find bi‐directional causality between the FDI‐to‐GDP ratio and the 
level of GDP. They also find that FDI has a lasting impact on GDP, and in a model for GDP 
and FDI as a fraction of gross capital formation, they also find long‐run effects from FDI to 
GDP. They take these results as evidence in favour of the hypothesis that FDI has an impact 
on GDP via knowledge transfers and adoption of new technology. 
Our paper focuses on the impact of institutional distance on OFDI, thus we expand 
the simple gravity equation using distance variables, namely, institutional distance. 
Ghemawat (2001) indicates that “distance” occurs not only in geographic terms but also in 
cultural, administrative and economic terms. Therefore, we include six measures of 
institutional quality distance between China and host countries, namely, government 
effectiveness distance, political stability distance, regulatory quality distance, voice and 
accountability distance, rule of law distance, and control of corruption distance. Finally, 
besides gravity-related factors, we also include the exchange rate of the host country as a 
control variable.  
 
3.1 Empirical Model 
We examine the relationship between OFDI and its determinants using Dummy Variable 
Least Squares (DVLS) estimation3 including dummy variables representing each year and 
                                                          
3 In order to tackle the potential cross-section correlation problem, we apply fixed effects generalised 
least squares (FEGLS) for robustness to check the consistency of the relationship between 
institutional differences and OFDI. 
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home countries. Feenstra (2015) indicates that the fixed effects model produces the most 
consistent and reliable results to estimate gravity of trade flows. The time-invariant variable 
(such as distance) is included in our model, therefore, Dummy Variable Least Squares 
(DVLS) estimation is appropriate and it works in the same way as the fixed effects model. 
Our empirical model for OFDI is specified as follows: 
ln(𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑡) + 𝛼1 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗)
+ 𝛼1 ln(𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼1 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡) + 𝐷𝑗 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where ln(𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡) is the logarithm of the amount of OFDI flows from China to the recipient 
or host country j at time t; 𝐺𝐷𝑃 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑁 represent the economic size of the host 
country and China, respectively; 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗  reflects geographic distance between country j 
and China; 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 stands for the exchange rate between China and the host country; and 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 refers to a set of institutional variables to measure institutional 
differences (or distances) between the host country and China. Also, we control for the 
country and time fixed effects by including two sets of dummy variables, 𝐷𝑗  and 𝐷𝑡. To 
mitigate the potential reverse causality problem, we lag all explanatory variables by one year. 
Also, it is plausible that there is a time effect of some explanatory variables such as GDP, 
institutional differences in the present year do not have an immediate influence on OFDI yet 
may have an effect on OFDI in a subsequent year. 
 
3.2 Data and Sample 
Our sample consists of a panel of 150 countries and covers the period from 2003 to 2015. The 
data used in this study were obtained from several sources. OFDI data are collected from the 
Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (2015, 2012, 2010). Data 
on GDP and the exchange rate are drawn from World Development Indicators. Our 
institutional quality variables are obtained from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 
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Data on geographic distance is taken from Mayer and Zignago (2011) and is measured in 
kilometres between the principal cities of countries weighted by population size in order to 
account for the uneven spread of population across a country. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. The average values of institutions of China 
and host countries display considerable distance. China has worse institutional qualities (apart 
from the government effectiveness) than the average level of the host countries. Table 2 
provides pairwise correlations between explanatory variables. Apart from correlation among 
institutional differences, there is no issue of high collinearity4. 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 3 reports the estimated results of the determinants of OFDI from China using DVLS. 
Column 1 shows the results of the baseline model which consider the effects of GDP level of 
host country, GDP level of China, exchange rate effectiveness of China and distance between 
China and host country. Again, in order to tackle the potential issue of reverse causality and 
consider the time effect of each determinant, we lag each variable (except distance) by one 
year. GDP level of host country, distance between China and host country and exchange rate 
have a negative and significant effect on OFDI from China at the 5% level of statistical 
significance, whereas GDP level of China exerts a positive and significant effect on OFDI at 
the 1% level.  
In columns 2-7, the effect of the institutional differences between China and host 
country is controlled for. As mentioned earlier, to avoid the collinearity problem among 
                                                          
4 At this stage, we do not strictly follow the variable choices from the gravity model due to the high 
correlation among GDP, GDP per capita, population and exchange rate. We remove variables of GDP 
per capita and population, and then there is no multicollinearity problem. Also, we only include one 
variable of institutional difference in one regression to avoid the multicollinearity problem. 
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variables of institutional difference, we include each variable separately. The results suggest 
that the difference of government effectiveness and the difference of control of corruption 
negatively and significantly correlate to OFDI. The rest of the indicators of institutional 
difference, however, do not have any significant impact on OFDI. The results of the control 
variables (used in the baseline model) in columns 2-7 are broadly similar to the results shown 
in column 1. The findings of Table 3 suggest that better economic performance of China 
(higher output level and stronger currency) leads to more OFDI from China. However, longer 
distance from China to host country reduces the level of OFDI. Interestingly, the negative 
significance of ln(GDP)(-1) indicates that a higher level of host country economic output 
lowers the level of OFDI from China. This may be because of the OFDI policies by China’s 
central government which has insisted on locating a large amount of investment in Africa and 
developing countries in Asia. For example, the ‘One Belt One Road’ enforces the basic OFDI 
policy direction by aiming to create a deeper connection with 70 developing countries by 
increasing the volume of OFDI and strengthening the cooperation for investment with those 
countries.  
[Table 3 about here] 
In order to provide potent evidence for the importance of institutional differences 
rather than the level of institutions, we test the effect of institutional quality of both home and 
host countries by comparing it to the institutional difference between home and host countries 
to see which one matters most. Similarly, we control for the effect of institutional quality by 
introducing single institutional quality in one regression for averting the collinearity problem. 
The estimated results of Table 4 suggest that neither the home country nor the host country 
institutional quality has a significant effect on OFDI from China. Compared to Table 3, the 
results indicate that the effect of institutional quality does not matter but institutional 
difference does. 
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[Table 4 about here] 
 
5. Robustness Analysis and Policy Implications 
In order to check the consistency of the results, we conduct a set of robustness tests using the 
same set of regressors used in Table 3, our main regression model. First, we apply Fixed 
Effects Generalised Least Squares (FEGLS) to address the potential cross-section correlation 
issue. The results are reported in Table 5. It is clear that the GDP level of China exerts a 
negative and significant effect on OFDI, whereas other baseline control variables appear not 
to be robust since they lose significance compared to their respective coefficients in Table 3.  
In terms of institutional differences, the results are essentially unchanged. Diff_Government(-
1) and Diff_Corruption (-1) have a negative and significant effect on OFDI at the 1% level. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Second, we consider the importance of the ‘One Belt One Road’ policy (China’s aim 
to prioritise the cooperation with 70 developing countries) using the GLS estimator with a 
difference-in-difference (DID) treatment5. These results, reported in Table 6, suggest that the 
effect of the institutional difference of government effectiveness and control of corruption 
show a consistent pattern. In terms of baseline control variables, only distance has a 
significant impact on the dependent variable. In addition, the DID interaction shows a 
negative effect on OFDI, indicating that the ‘One Belt One Road’ policy, in fact, reduced the 
motivation of OFDI from China. Although the policy aimed at stimulating Chinese FDI to 70 
developing countries, our data unveils a downward influence, at least, in the short-run. The 
results may differ over a longer time span but we only have data up to 2015. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
5 As the ‘One Belt One Road’ policy was announced in 2013, we add a time dummy, coded 1, if 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ≥ 2013, and 0 otherwise. We add a country dummy, coded 1, if the country is in the 
cooperation list, and 0 otherwise. Then, we construct an interaction term using time and country 
dummies.  
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our results would suggest that Chinese investors are influenced more by the difference of the 
institutional environment between China and the host country than the government 
intervention. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Third, we use Heckman procedures to tackle the potential sample selection bias 
resulting from the exclusion of countries having no FDI from China. These results, reported 
in Table 7, suggest that institutional differences, Diff_Government(-1) and Diff_Corruption (-
1), have a robust negative impact on OFDI. Furthermore, the Mills ratio is significant at the 
1% level, indicating that there is a sample selection bias if we do not control for the Mills 
ratio. 
[Table 7 about here] 
To conclude, institutional differences exert a robust effect since their significance and 
signs are stable across Table 3 and Tables 5-7. The institutional difference between China 
and host country determines the willingness of Chinese MNEs to invest. Based on the mean 
values of institutions from Table 1, we can observe that the mean of China’s government 
effectiveness is higher than the worldwide mean. The gap of government effectiveness can 
increase the costs of Chinese MNEs investing abroad and lower their efficiency when they 
encounter bureaucratic administration and investment approval from authorities since host 
countries’ governments, to some extent, tend to impact the volume, scope and direction of 
OFDI from China. Regarding the difference of control of corruption, although China has 
made considerable efforts to control the corruption since President Xi started an anti-
corruption campaign in 2012, China’s mean of control of corruption is still lower than the 
worldwide mean due to various historical reasons. Under such a corrupted environment, 
Chinese investors were used to spending extra costs on bribery to obtain some advantages for 
their investment. When Chinese MNEs go abroad and face a more honest and transparent 
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environment, they find it difficult to take advantages from political connections and this 
reduces their investment motivation. In addition, the institutional difference seems to be more 
important than the ‘One Belt One Road’ policy. Although the original intention of the 
government was to support MNEs to make more investment abroad, our data suggest that the 
effect seems to be going in the opposite direction. According to Amendolagine et al. (2013), 
the reason might be that the Chinese central government uses OFDI as a political tool to 
invest in strategic areas and sectors - some Chinese MNEs appear to be forced by Chinese 
central government to invest abroad. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we contribute to the literature by highlighting the importance of institutional 
difference between home and host countries rather than the level of institutional quality in the 
home or host country. Using a panel of 150 countries over the period 2003-2015, we examine 
the separate effect of each institutional difference indicator instead of an aggregated 
institutional index as employed in prior studies. It is now generally recognised that 
institutional differences have a robust influence in reducing OFDI from China. More 
specifically, the institutional differences of government effectiveness and control of 
corruption have a statistically significant negative effect on OFDI from China. In contrast to 
prior studies which emphasise that the levels of the institutional quality in the home or host 
countries are the determinants of FDI, we do not find any significance of home or host 
countries’ institutional quality. Also, we do not find a robust effect of distance or economic 
performance on OFDI and we do not find any significant effect on the level of institutional 
quality. In addition, we find that the ‘One Belt One Road’ policy does not have the expected 
positive effect on Chinese OFDI. 
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One of the most important implications that flows from our findings is that China 
should keep reducing its corruption level and that host countries should focus on increasing 
their government effectiveness to close the gap of institutional difference to benefit from a 
‘win-win’ result from Chinese OFDI. 
One of the limitations of the present study relates to data availability which precluded 
us from distinguishing the effects of industrial/sectoral FDI inflows. Li et al. (2017) 
emphasise that the heterogeneity of FDI inflows to different economic sectors can be 
determined by distinctive factors. Therefore, it is plausible to infer that Chinese OFDI from 
different economic sectors also might be influenced by different factors. Further research 
could investigate the determinants of Chinese OFDI using disaggregated data of FDI 
outflows.  
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Appendix A. Variable descriptions and data sources 
Variables Description Source 
OFDI  Annual outward FDI flows from China to the recipient or host 
country 
Statistical Bulletin 
of China’s 
Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment 
(2015, 2012, 2010) 
GDP Home country GDP in constant 2010 USD World 
development 
indicator  
GDPCHN China GDP in constant 2010 USD World 
development 
indicator  
Distance Geographic distance between China and home country (capital) 
weighted by population size 
Mayer and 
Zignago (2011) 
Exchange Home country exchange rate World 
development 
indicator  
Democracy An index that measures voice and accountability which captures 
perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media, ranging 
from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
Political An index that measures political stability which captures 
perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically-motivated violence, including terrorism, ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
Government An index that measures government effectiveness which captures 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate 
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
Regulatory An index that measures regulatory quality which captures 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development, ranging from approximately -2.5 to 
2.5. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
Law An index that measures rule of law which captures perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence, ranging from approximately 
-2.5 to 2.5. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
Corruption An index that measures the control of corruption which captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests, 
ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
 
Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
ln(OFDI) 1801 9.3642 0.2589 -0.1863 11.5253 
ln(GDP) 2232 24.1887 2.3255 18.7084 30.4403 
ln(GDPCHN) 2366 29.3070 0.3570 28.6993 29.8180 
ln(Distance) 2249 9.0127 0.5420 7.0246 9.8580 
ln(Exchange) 1953 3.4230 2.7839 -1.3137 22.6288 
Democracy 2265 -0.0638 1.0082 -2.3134 1.8010 
Political 2267 -0.0785 0.9876 -3.1808 1.6881 
Government 2262 -0.0183 1.0072 -2.1632 2.4370 
Regulatory 2262 -0.0233 1.0023 -2.5296 2.2605 
Law 2267 -0.0530 1.0054 -2.0324 2.1003 
Corruption 2263 -0.0377 1.0289 -1.7728 2.4700 
DemocracyCHN 2366 -1.6316 0.0854 -1.7490 -1.4625 
PoliticalCHN 2366 -0.5269 0.0636 -0.6571 -0.3902 
GovernmentCHN 2366 0.0904 0.1454 -0.1200 0.4080 
RegulatoryCHN 2366 -0.2385 0.0570 -0.3334 -0.1500 
LawCHN 2366 -0.4941 0.0748 -0.6395 -0.4071 
CorruptionCHN 2366 -0.4733 0.1022 -0.6087 -0.2821 
Diff_Democracy 2265 1.6049 0.9511 0.0012 3.3694 
Diff_Political 2267 0.9185 0.5799 0.0002 2.7906 
Diff_Government 2262 0.8625 0.5515 0.0000 2.5712 
Diff_Regulatory 2262 0.8299 0.6045 0.0000 2.5500 
Diff_Law 2267 0.8604 0.6855 0.0011 2.6370 
Diff_Corruption 2263 0.8444 0.7385 0.0001 3.0357 
Note: GDP: GDP level of host country; GDPCHN: GDP level of China. Exchange: Exchange rate 
effectiveness of China. Government: Government effectiveness of host country. GovernmentCHN: 
Government effectiveness of China. Political: Political stability of host country. PoliticalCHN: Political 
stability of China. Regulatory: Regulatory quality of host country. RegulatoryCHN: Regulatory quality of 
China. Democracy: Voice and accountability of host country. Democracy: Voice and accountability of China. 
Law: Rule of law of host country. LawCHN: Rule of law of China. Corruption: Control of corruption of host 
country. CorruptionCHN: Control of corruption of China. Diff_Government: Difference of government 
effectiveness between China and host country. Diff_Political: Difference of political stability between China 
and host country. Diff_Regulatory: Difference of regulatory quality between China and host country. Diff_ 
Democracy: Difference of voice and accountability between China and host country. Diff_Law: Difference of 
rule of law between China and host country. Diff_Corruption: Difference of control of corruption between 
China and host country.  
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Table 2 Correlation matrix 
 
ln(OFDI) ln(GDP) ln(GDPCHN) ln(Distance) ln(Exchange) Diff_Democracy  
ln(OFDI) 1.0000           
ln(GDP) 0.0648*** 1.0000 
    
ln(GDPCHN) 0.0192 0.0619*** 1.0000 
   
ln(Distance) -0.0932*** -0.1974*** 0.0000 1.0000 
  
ln(Exchange) -0.0661** -0.1623*** 0.0358 -0.0578** 1.0000 
 
Diff_Democracy 0.0138 0.2070*** 0.0272 0.1496*** -0.3506*** 1.0000 
Diff_Political 0.0281 0.0654*** -0.00940 -0.1330*** -0.1914*** 0.4227*** 
Diff_Government 0.0545** 0.1418*** 0.0439** -0.1413*** 0.0914*** 0.0985*** 
Diff_Regulatory 0.0772*** 0.3603*** -0.0105 -0.1548*** -0.2269*** 0.3574*** 
Diff_Law 0.0586** 0.3483*** -0.0329 -0.0873*** -0.3359*** 0.5909*** 
Diff_Corruption 0.0623*** 0.3539*** -0.0124 -0.0425** -0.3153*** 0.5658*** 
 Diff_Political Diff_Government Diff_Regulatory Diff_Law Diff_Corruption  
Diff_Political 1.0000 
     
Diff_Government 0.3499*** 1.0000 
    
Diff_Regulatory 0.4788*** 0.6913*** 1.0000 
   
Diff_Law 0.6252*** 0.6065*** 0.8160*** 1.0000 
  
Diff_Corruption 0.5964*** 0.5989*** 0.7559*** 0.9119*** 1.0000   
Note: GDP: GDP level of host country; GDPCHN: GDP level of China. Exchange: Exchange rate effectiveness of China. Diff_Government: Difference of government effectiveness between 
China and host country. Diff_Political: Difference of political stability between China and host country. Diff_Regulatory: Difference of regulatory quality between China and host country. 
Diff_ Democracy: Difference of voice and accountability between China and host country. Diff_Law: Difference of rule of law between China and host country. Diff_Corruption: Difference 
of control of corruption between China and host country. *** Statistical significance at 1% level; ** Statistical significance at 5% level; * Statistical significance at 10% level. All pairwise 
correlations are calculated using the maximum number of observations available in the sample.
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Table 3 Institutional difference and OFDI from China - DVLS estimation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ln(GDP)(-1) -0.0293** -0.0292** -0.0289** -0.0291** -0.0306** -0.0306** -0.0292** 
 (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0133) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0121) 
ln(GDPCHN)(-1) 0.0615*** 0.0684*** 0.0625*** 0.0618*** 0.0629*** 0.0625*** 0.0617*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0196) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0183) 
ln(Distance) -0.1747** -0.2550*** -0.1689** -0.1638** -0.1724** -0.1832*** -0.1885*** 
 (0.0680) (0.0767) (0.0678) (0.0808) (0.0731) (0.0692) (0.0688) 
ln(Exchange)(-1) -0.0036** -0.0023 -0.0037** -0.0036** -0.0037** -0.0037** -0.0038** 
 (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
Diff_Government(-1)  -0.0440***      
  (0.0131)      
Diff_Political(-1)   0.0077     
   (0.0057)     
Diff_Regulatory(-1)    0.0063    
    (0.0142)    
Diff_Democracy(-1)     -0.0032   
     (0.0086)   
Diff_Law(-1)      -0.0014  
      (0.0122)  
Diff_Corruption(-1)       -0.0354** 
       (0.0156) 
constant 9.7118*** 10.2414*** 9.6081*** 9.5989*** 9.6812*** 9.7846*** 9.8573*** 
 (0.7212) (0.7005) (0.7488) (0.8392) (0.7245) (0.7940) (0.7255) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1394 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 
R2 0.7665 0.7691 0.7667 0.7666 0.7666 0.7666 0.7681 
Note: GDP: GDP level of host country; GDPCHN: GDP level of China. Exchange: Exchange rate effectiveness of China. 
Diff_Government: Difference of government effectiveness between China and host country. Diff_Political: Difference of 
political stability between China and host country. Diff_Regulatory: Difference of regulatory quality between China and host 
country. Diff_ Democracy: Difference of voice and accountability between China and host country. Diff_Law: Difference of rule 
of law between China and host country. Diff_Corruption: Difference of control of corruption between China and host country. 
All explanatory variables except Distance are lagged one time period. GDP, GDPCHN and Exchange are represented in natural 
logarithms. Dependent variable is outward FDI. Estimation is by Dummy Variables Least Squares (DVLS) with robust standard 
errors (in parentheses). *** Statistical significance at 1% level; ** Statistical significance at 5% level; * Statistical significance at 
10% level.  
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Table 4 Institutional quality and OFDI from China - DVLS estimation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ln(GDP)(-1) -0.0336** -0.0337** -0.0366*** -0.0304** -0.0362** -0.0261** 
 (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0127) (0.0141) (0.0119) 
ln(GDPCHN)(-1) 0.0625*** 0.0611** 0.0223 0.0698 0.0640*** 0.0580*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0248) (0.3423) (0.0644) (0.0183) (0.0174) 
ln(Distance) -0.2135** -0.2295*** -0.2308*** -0.1760** -0.2718*** -0.1105* 
 (0.0851) (0.0869) (0.0812) (0.0748) (0.1031) (0.0665) 
ln(Exchange)(-1) -0.0035** -0.0036** -0.0038** -0.0036** -0.0038** -0.0035** 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) 
Government(-1) 0.0086      
 (0.0119)      
GovernmentCHN(-1) 0.0042      
 (0.0405)      
Political(-1)  0.0053     
  (0.0048)     
PoliticalCHN(-1)  0.0779     
  (0.6419)     
Regulatory(-1)   0.0111    
   (0.0101)    
RegulatoryCHN (-1)   0.8964    
   (7.3174)    
Democracy (-1)    -0.0017   
    (0.0086)   
DemocracyCHN(-1)    0.0728   
    (0.5533)   
Law(-1)     0.0178  
     (0.0122)  
LawCHN(-1)     0.0048  
     (0.1116)  
Corruption(-1)      -0.0152 
      (0.0100) 
CorruptionCHN(-1)      0.0952 
      (0.6981) 
constant 10.1174*** 10.3393*** 11.7932 9.6190*** 10.6464*** 9.2106*** 
 (0.7703) (1.2199) (12.5370) (1.2373) (1.0153) (0.7933) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 
R2 0.7666 0.7667 0.7667 0.7666 0.7668 0.7668 
Note: GDP: GDP level of host country; GDPCHN: GDP level of China. Exchange: Exchange rate effectiveness of China. 
Government: Government effectiveness of host country. GovernmentCHN: Government effectiveness of China. Political: 
Political stability of host country. PoliticalCHN: Political stability of China. Regulatory: Regulatory quality of host country. 
RegulatoryCHN: Regulatory quality of China. Democracy: Voice and accountability of host country. Democracy: Voice and 
accountability of China. Law: Rule of law of host country. LawCHN: Rule of law of China. Corruption: Control of corruption 
of host country. CorruptionCHN: Control of corruption of China. All explanatory variables except Distance are lagged one time 
period. GDP, GDPCHN and Exchange are represented in natural logarithms. Dependent variable is outward FDI. Estimation is by 
Dummy Variables Least Squares (DVLS) with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *** Statistical significance at 1% level; ** 
Statistical significance at 5% level; * Statistical significance at 10% level. 
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Table 5 Institutional difference and OFDI from China - FEGLS estimation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ln(GDP)(-1) 0.0015 0.0050 0.0015 0.0019 0.0010 0.0013 0.0002 
 (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0037) 
ln(GDPCHN)(-1) 0.0116*** 0.0119*** 0.0121*** 0.0116*** 0.0124*** 0.0117*** 0.0132*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
ln(Distance) -0.0028 -0.0006 -0.0022 0.0039 0.0024 -0.0074 -0.0132 
 (0.0198) (0.0234) (0.0203) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0196) (0.0218) 
ln(Exchange)(-1) -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Diff_Government(-1)  -0.0086***      
  (0.0022)      
Diff_Political(-1)   0.0022     
   (0.0015)     
Diff_Regulatory(-1)    0.0029    
    (0.0023)    
Diff_Democracy(-1)     -0.0028   
     (0.0025)   
Diff_Law(-1)      -0.0039  
      (0.0025)  
Diff_Corruption(-1)       -0.0083*** 
       (0.0019) 
constant 8.9979*** 8.9012*** 8.9772*** 8.9300*** 8.9447*** 9.0433*** 9.0810*** 
 (0.1888) (0.2226) (0.1957) (0.2009) (0.1978) (0.1862) (0.2115) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1394 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 
Note: GDP: GDP level of host country; GDPCHN: GDP level of China. Exchange: Exchange rate effectiveness of China. Diff_Government: Difference of government effectiveness between 
China and host country. Diff_Political: Difference of political stability between China and host country. Diff_Regulatory: Difference of regulatory quality between China and host country. 
Diff_ Democracy: Difference of voice and accountability between China and host country. Diff_Law: Difference of rule of law between China and host country. Diff_Corruption: Difference 
of control of corruption between China and host country. All explanatory variables except Distance are lagged one time period. GDP, GDPCHN and Exchange are represented in natural 
logarithms. Dependent variable is outward FDI. Estimation is by Fixed Effects Generalised Least Squares (FEGLS) with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *** Statistical significance at 
1% level; ** Statistical significance at 5% level; * Statistical significance at 10% level.
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Table 6 Institutional difference and OFDI from China – FEGLS estimation with DID treatments 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ln(GDP)(-1) -0.0288 -0.0286 -0.0282 -0.0299 -0.0298 -0.0302 -0.0280 
 (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0193) 
ln(GDPCHN)(-1) 0.0201 0.0680 0.0220 0.0208 0.0224 0.0189 0.0256 
 (0.1191) (0.1203) (0.1201) (0.1202) (0.1202) (0.1202) (0.1197) 
ln(Distance) -1.0646*** -1.1121*** -1.0572*** -1.0734*** -1.0545*** -1.0772*** -1.0570*** 
 (0.1685) (0.1692) (0.1699) (0.1748) (0.1728) (0.1711) (0.1690) 
ln(Exchange)(-1) -0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0032 
 (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) 
Diff_Government(-1)  -0.0390***      
  (0.0111)      
Diff_Political(-1)   0.0072     
   (0.0076)     
Diff_Regulatory(-1)    -0.0012    
    (0.0121)    
Diff_Democracy(-1)     -0.0052   
     (0.0120)   
Diff_Law(-1)      -0.0047  
      (0.0137)  
Diff_Corruption(-1)       -0.0337*** 
       (0.0116) 
Time 0.0459 0.0016 0.0445 0.0459 0.0448 0.0477 0.0405 
 (0.1209) (0.1220) (0.1219) (0.1219) (0.1219) (0.1220) (0.1215) 
Treated -0.5151*** -0.5020*** -0.5148*** -0.5158*** -0.5150*** -0.5158*** -0.5044*** 
 (0.0682) (0.0682) (0.0684) (0.0687) (0.0684) (0.0685) (0.0683) 
Time*Treated -0.0164** -0.0157** -0.0160** -0.0160** -0.0163** -0.0161** -0.0181** 
 (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0077) 
constant 18.8775*** 17.9336*** 18.7318*** 18.9590*** 18.7522*** 19.0562*** 18.6599*** 
 (3.8182) (3.8414) (3.8526) (3.8622) (3.8690) (3.8670) (3.8376) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1394 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 
Note: GDP: GDP level of host country; GDPCHN: GDP level of China. Exchange: Exchange rate effectiveness of China. Diff_Government: Difference of government effectiveness between 
China and host country. Diff_Political: Difference of political stability between China and host country. Diff_Regulatory: Difference of regulatory quality between China and host country. 
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Diff_ Democracy: Difference of voice and accountability between China and host country. Diff_Law: Difference of rule of law between China and host country. Diff_Corruption: Difference 
of control of corruption between China and host country. Time, Treated, and Time*Treated: DID constitutive and interaction terms. All explanatory variables except Distance are lagged one 
time period. GDP, GDPCHN and Exchange are represented in natural logarithms. Dependent variable is outward FDI. Estimation is by Fixed Effects Generalised Least Squares (FEGLS) with 
robust standard errors (in parentheses). *** Statistical significance at 1% level; ** Statistical significance at 5% level; * Statistical significance at 10% level. 
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Table 7 Institutional difference and OFDI from China – FEGLS estimation with Hackman procedures 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ln(GDP)(-1) 0.0026 0.0051 0.0029 0.0018 0.0018 0.0013 0.0042 
 (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0037) 
ln(GDPCHN)(-1) 0.0153*
** 
0.0150**
* 
0.0160*
** 
0.0158*
** 
0.0163*
** 
0.0159*
** 
0.0152**
* 
 (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
ln(Distance) -0.0170 -0.0157 -0.0145 -0.0150 -0.0122 -0.0263 -0.0136 
 (0.0193) (0.0225) (0.0196) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0214) 
ln(Exchange)(-1) -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Diff_Government(
-1) 
 -
0.0070**
* 
     
  (0.0022)      
Diff_Political(-1)   0.0019*     
   (0.0011)     
Diff_Regulatory(-
1) 
   0.0039*
* 
   
    (0.0018)    
Diff_Democracy(-
1) 
    -0.0033*   
     (0.0020)   
Diff_Law(-1)      -0.0011  
      (0.0023)  
Diff_Corruption(-
1) 
      -
0.0062**
* 
       (0.0020) 
Mills 0.0167*
** 
0.0160**
* 
0.0166*
** 
0.0162*
** 
0.0169*
** 
0.0168*
** 
0.0188**
*  (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0022) 
constant 8.9798*
** 
8.9298**
* 
8.9313*
** 
8.9616*
** 
8.9325*
** 
9.0731*
** 
8.9224**
* 
 (0.1842) (0.2093) (0.1882) (0.1898) (0.1918) (0.1895) (0.2070) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1394 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 
Note: GDP: GDP level of host country; GDPCHN: GDP level of China. Exchange: Exchange rate 
effectiveness of China. Diff_Government: Difference of government effectiveness between China and host 
country. Diff_Political: Difference of political stability between China and host country. Diff_Regulatory: 
Difference of regulatory quality between China and host country. Diff_ Democracy: Difference of voice and 
accountability between China and host country. Diff_Law: Difference of rule of law between China and host 
country. Diff_Corruption: Difference of control of corruption between China and host country. Mills: Mills 
ratio. All explanatory variables except Distance are lagged one time period. GDP, GDPCHN and Exchange are 
represented in natural logarithms. Dependent variable is outward FDI. Estimation is by Fixed Effects 
Generalised Least Squares (FEGLS) with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *** Statistical significance at 
1% level; ** Statistical significance at 5% level; * Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
